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Abstract: By incorporating the additional existence of switching costs into 
an oligopoly search model by Stahl (1989), this paper dispels the misleading 
idea that search costs can simply be treated as a form of switching cost. Due to 
the assumption that search costs, unlike switching costs, are incurred 
unconditionally on the decision to switch suppliers it is shown that the 
anticompetitive effects of search costs are consistently larger than those from 
an equivalent level of switching costs. The finding suggests that obfuscation 
practices that aim to deter consumers from searching, such as competing on 
deliberately complex tariffs, may be particularly powerful relative to practices 
that increase the costs of substitution between firms, such as loyalty programs 
or termination fees.  
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1. Introduction  
Most previous research into the effects of search and switching costs has 
considered each cost in isolation. Here, an oligopoly model is presented that 
allows consumers to face both a cost of finding and a cost of trading with, an 
alternative supplier. This dual-cost approach allows us to better understand 
the relative effects of search and switching costs on competition and welfare.  
 
As will be discussed more formally, search and switching costs can differ in 
several ways. However one can clearly observe that the two costs are 
functionally different by noting, as in Table 1, that many consumers choose to 
search without then choosing to switch suppliers. As distinct from previous 
single-cost approaches, the paper is able to characterise consumers’ optimal 
‘search to switch’ strategies in order to better describe how extensively 
consumers should search the market and to which firm, if any, the consumer 
should switch. 
 
Table 1: Search and Switching Behaviour across Eight UK Markets1  
 
Market Prob (Search) Prob (Switch|Search)
Electricty 0.28 0.71
Mobile Phone 0.29 0.68
Car Insurance 0.40 0.67
Nat/Overseas Calls 0.17 0.62
Mortgage 0.22 0.55
Fixed Line 0.14 0.51
Broadband Internet 0.26 0.51
Bank 0.08 0.51
Average 0.23 0.62  
 
By doing so, this paper dispels the misleading idea that search and switching 
costs are some synonymous form of transaction cost. By incorporating the 
additional existence of switching costs into a standard oligopoly model of 
search costs by Stahl (1989), it is shown that the differences between the two 
                                                          
1 This data comes from a detailed survey of 2027 UK consumers in June 2005, conducted by 
MORI for the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy at the University of East Anglia. The full 
results of this survey are analysed by Chang et al (forthcoming).   
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costs are important enough for the (potentially) anti-competitive effects of the 
two costs to differ in magnitude. Indeed, the model proposes that the anti-
competitive effects of search costs exceed the effects of an equivalent level of 
switching costs. Despite this result being dependent upon how one, perhaps 
arbitrarily, defines and distinguishes between the two costs, the differences in 
effects are demonstrated to derive from one key assumption. Crucially, the 
search activity of consumers is discouraged relatively more from a unit 
increase in search costs because search costs are incurred unconditionally, 
while switching costs are only incurred conditional on having found a 
worthwhile alternative. The expenditure of search costs, unlike switching 
costs, is not a sufficient condition for switching suppliers.  
 
Although the model only considers the levels of the two costs exogenously, 
this finding may suggest that, with all else equal, industry practices that aim 
to increase the difficulty with which consumers access and comprehend price 
and product information, such as practices that involve competing with 
deliberately complex tariffs or disrupting search engine results, could be more 
potent than practices that aim to increase the cost of substitution between 
firms, such as the provision of loyalty programs or termination fees. 
Obfuscation strategies appear to be particularly powerful in increasing firms’ 
profits. It is further found as can be the case when consumers face search costs 
alone, that the effect of an increase in the number of competitors can be 
potentially ambiguous for consumer welfare. It is therefore suggested that in 
such markets, it may be the case that policy is best targeted at reducing search 
costs rather than increasing competition or reducing switching costs. 
 
Finally, unlike some previous single-cost studies that confuse the empirical 
effects of the two costs, this approach can provide some equilibrium 
conditions that may offer the potential to separately identify search and 
switching costs in future research.  
 
Section 2 provides a more detailed description of the differences between 
search and switching costs and gives an overview of their respective 
Page 3 
literatures. The model is presented in section 3, with its main results in section 
4. In Section 5 the implications and limitations of the paper are discussed, 
before section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Definitions and Previous Literatures  
 
Under one of several, largely equivalent definitions, switching costs are said 
to arise when ‘there is a cost incurred by changing supplier that is not 
incurred by remaining with the current provider’ (OFT 2003). As search costs 
can be thought of similarly, they are often treated as another member of the 
wider family of switching costs that also includes other forms of transaction 
costs, the costs resulting from lost compatibility with already existing physical 
or human capital, the costs of increased product uncertainty and any lost 
loyalty benefits from the original supplier (Klemperer 1995). However, as 
Klemperer and the OFT point out, the two costs differ in several respects. 
Unlike switching costs, search costs i) might have to be paid before any 
purchase in the market, ii) have to be paid regardless of whether the 
consumer chooses to switch suppliers and in a related sense, iii) may be 
incurred repeatedly before switching2.  
 
To emphasise and sharpen these differences, and to clearly set out how this 
paper will treat the two costs, the following definitions are proposed.  
 
Search costs are the total costs spent by a consumer in identifying and interpreting a 
firm’s product and price offering, regardless of whether the consumer buys the 
product from that firm or not.  
 
Switching costs are the total costs incurred by a fully informed consumer through 
deciding to change suppliers that would not have been incurred by remaining with 
the current supplier. 
 
                                                          
2
 A further difference may arise in the case, not considered in this paper, where switching 
costs differ across firms. If so, it is possible that the incurring of search costs may lower the 
effective level of a consumer’s switching cost.   
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The first definition includes Ellison and Ellison’s (2004) proposal of classifying 
search costs, not only as the costs of collecting information, but also as the 
(boundedly rational) effort costs of interpreting and processing the 
information. Specifically, under the assumption of product homogeneity as 
will be considered later, search costs will refer both to the costs of finding a 
firm’s price and to the possible effort involved in understanding how such a 
price ranks against the consumer’s reservation price and other firms’ prices.  
 
The second definition emphasises how switching costs differ from search 
costs by making switching costs dependent upon the consumer being fully 
informed of all firms’ price and product offerings. Thus, switching costs will 
now only refer to any transaction, loyalty, or compatibility costs, as all other 
costs associated with information and uncertainty have been categorised as 
search costs. While one may argue that the assumed attributes of the two 
costs are arbitrary, it is later shown how each of the costs’ attributes act to 
generate the differing welfare effects.   
 
Despite their similarities and obvious interdependence most previous 
analyses of search and switching costs have remained largely independent of 
each other. The two theoretical literatures have found that increased levels of 
both search and switching costs can increase equilibrium market power by 
reducing the substitutability between competing product offerings. While this 
finding is very clear cut with regard to search costs, it is not universally true 
for switching costs due to their additional ability to generate pro-competitive 
effects that result from firms fiercely competing for any new consumers that 
are yet to be locked in3 . The empirical literatures have documented the 
existence of the two costs across many markets. Superseding the older 
literatures that examined the effects of switching cost proxies on consumers’ 
choice to switch suppliers or the nature of price dispersion, more modern 
                                                          
3
 See the search cost review by Baye et al (forthcoming), the switching cost reviews by 
Klemperer (1995) and Farrell and Klemperer (2006) and the overview and discussion in 
Waterson (2003). Beggs and Klemperer (1992) conclude that in most reasonable circumstances, 
the anti-competitive effects of switching costs will dominate.  
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studies have used equilibrium restrictions from theoretical models of 
competition of switching costs or search costs alone to recover estimates of the 
magnitude of either cost4. While these twin literatures have provided a deep 
theoretical and empirical understanding of search or switching costs, they 
may be criticised for considering each cost in isolation. The theoretical models 
fail to understand the combined effects of the two costs and are unable to 
assess their relative effects on welfare to aid policy decisions. Perhaps, more 
worryingly, previous empirical estimates of the two costs may be biased as a 
result of only analysing one cost at a time. As the observable effects of the two 
costs can be similar, using the theoretical restrictions from a model that only 
considers one cost may lead to potentially large identification problems. This 
paper attempts to address both of these problems. By providing an oligopoly 
model that considers both costs, the paper firstly, provides welfare and policy 
assessments, and secondly, begins to establish a set of equilibrium restrictions 
that may be useful for future empirical work. 
 
Only a limited selection of theoretical papers has previously considered the 
combined role of search and switching costs. Rather restrictively, Padilla 
(1995) assumes that consumers have infinite switching costs and either zero or 
infinite search costs, while Sturluson (2002a) assumes that consumers have 
either search costs or switching costs, but not both. Schlesinger and von der 
Schulenburg (1991) allow consumers to face both forms of costs, but offer a 
counter-intuitive, pure strategy price equilibrium where it is not clear why 
consumers are searching. They suggest that search and switching costs have 
symmetric effects on market prices. Closest to this paper, is the theoretical 
section of Knittel (1997) that provides (almost) comprehensive 
characterisation of consumers’ behaviour for any level of search and 
switching cost. Knittel, however does not extend the analysis to consider the 
endogenous choice of prices by firms, nor does he consider the welfare effects 
of the two costs. Empirical assessments of the two costs together have also 
                                                          
4 See for example Kim et al (2003) and Moraga-González and Wildenbeest (2006). 
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been rare. A set of papers that use individual consumer data to analyse the 
relative effects of the two costs on switching decisions provide contradictory 
results. Indeed, the effects of search costs have been shown to be smaller than 
switching costs (Sturluson 2002b), larger than switching costs (Giulietti et al 
2005), or even insignificant (Rangel 2005). A notable paper by Moshkin and 
Shachar (2002) introduces a methodology to identify the effects of the two 
costs when consumers are constrained by either cost, but not as in the case of 
this analysis, by both5. Using a panel dataset of US television viewers they 
suggest that 71% of consumers’ behaviour is more consistent with the 
existence of search costs rather than switching costs.  
 
3. Model  
The model incorporates switching costs into a simplified version of Stahl 
(1989)6. Let there be n firms, each selling a single homogeneous good of 
known quality to a unit mass of consumers, who each have a unit demand 
with a maximum willingness to pay of V >0. Firms are assumed to pick a 
single price, +ℜ∈ip , and since it is assumed that firms neither have 
production costs nor capacity constraints, firm profits can be denoted as 
iii qp=pi ∀ },...1{ ni = . 
 
Consumers are located symmetrically such that a (1/n) share of consumers is 
‘local’ to each firm. A consumer who is local to any given firm has the ability 
to costlessly learn the local firm’s price and trade with that firm if desired, but 
may face positive costs of searching and trading with other, non-local firms. 
More specifically, consumers are divided into two types. A proportion, 0>µ , 
of consumers, referred to as shoppers, have zero search and switching costs. 
                                                          
5
 Specifically, their method relies on the differences in the effects of each cost following a 
change in the quality of consumers’ alternative options. They show that a consumer who is 
constrained by switching costs will be equally likely to switch following a reduction in the 
quality of the current product choice relative to an equivalent increase in the quality of an 
alternative product, whereas a reduction in the quality of the current choice will produce an 
asymmetrically larger effect in a consumer constrained by search costs. 
6
 As in Janssen et al (2005) consumers are assumed to exhibit unit, not general demand 
functions. 
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Shoppers treat all firms as if they were local; being free to learn all market 
prices and trade with any firm they choose. In contrast, the remaining )1( µ−  
proportion of captive consumers, face both a positive search cost, c >0, to 
learn a non-local firm’s price and a positive switching cost, s >0, to trade with 
a non-local firm, where both costs are common knowledge and exogenous7.  
 
When compared to shoppers, captives can be thought of as consumers who 
perhaps dislike, have little time for, or are not so savvy at shopping around 
for the best market deals. Instead of the current specification where captives 
face both costs and shoppers face neither, it could have been assumed, that 
the shoppers face zero search costs and positive switching costs. As will be 
further discussed in section 5, although this second specification may be more 
realistic, it fails to provide a like for like comparison of the effects of the two 
costs. Sturluson (2002a) considers a market consisting of consumers that 
either face search or switching costs alone.   
 
In a model of a market for a homogeneous good, it is perhaps harder to 
imagine the possible sources of switching costs. One useful example may be 
an energy market where consumers, even after searching between suppliers, 
have to spend time cancelling an old account and setting up a new one. 
Alternatively, one can relax the assumption of homogeneous products, by 
thinking of the switching cost as resulting from some form of symmetric 
product differentiation, where the consumer have a preference for the local 
product.  
 
The captives shall be assumed to be able to sequentially search firms at a cost 
of c per firm with the perfect recall ability of returning to a previously 
searched firm if desired. With the increasing use of price comparison sites on 
the Internet, some may argue that this assumption is unrealistic, but this 
assumption is used for two reasons. Firstly, the sequential approach actually 
provides a generalisation of the case of ‘simultaneous’ search. This is shown 
                                                          
7The possibilities when firms are able to choose the level of costs are discussed in section 5. 
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in Appendix B where all the results of the paper are replicated (except Result 
1, as shall be explained) under the assumption that consumers can, instead, 
simultaneously search any number, )1( −≤ nx , of non-local prices for a single 
search cost of c. Secondly, as Ellison and Ellison (2004) point out, the 
sequential assumption may still be more realistic. Faced with fiercer price 
competition, firms face an incentive to disrupt search engines’ results by 
offering optional add-on charges that consumers can only fully assess by 
manually visiting individual websites.  
  
In solving the model, the paper will consider the set of symmetric Nash 
equilibria for the following static, simultaneous game where all agents are 
assumed to be risk-neutral with orthodox preferences. Firms simultaneously 
select a (perhaps degenerate) pricing distribution F(p), with density f(p) and 
support ],[ pp , while at the same time, consumers each select, what I term as, 
a ‘search to switch’ strategy. Such a strategy must prescribe how extensively 
the market should be searched, if at all, and to which firm, if any, the 
consumer should switch. An optimal strategy will do this in a way that 
maximises consumers’ net expected trading surplus.  
 
‘Search to Switch’ Strategies 
The analysis proceeds by firstly finding the consumers’ optimal search to 
switch strategies for any price distribution, F(p), and then given this, by 
finding the firms optimal pricing response. While the shoppers’ optimal 
strategy is straightforward, we shall find that the captive consumers’ optimal 
strategy will be largely dependent upon the use of two reservation prices. A 
captive should begin searching only if its local firm’s price exceeds a first, 
local reservation price, and then stop searching and switch to an alternative 
supplier only if a price is discovered that is below the level of a second, 
standard reservation price.  
 
To find the optimal strategies for the two consumer types, it is useful to 
introduce some notation. Let us denote the vector of selected market prices as 
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},...{ 1 nn ppP = , which, before search, for any consumer i, can be partitioned 
into the consumer’s (known) local price Lp , and the vector of (unknown) 
non-local prices, }\{ LnNL pPP =  (ignoring any labelling for consumer i). If 
consumer i is a captive engaging in search, his (initially empty) vector of 
known non-local prices shall be referred to as }{}{ φ∪⊆ NLNL PK , while 
}}min{,min{ sKpB NLL +=  will refer to his best known ‘deal’. 
 
The optimal strategy for shoppers is trivial. Shoppers costlessly learn all 
market prices and will costlessly trade with the firm offering the best market 
price, nPmin , conditional on this price being less than or equal to V.  In the 
case that some number of firms, m>1, tie at the lowest market price, shoppers 
are assumed to randomly choose between the m firms.    
 
To find the optimal strategy for captives, the well-known optimality of 
reservation price rules for search problems (e.g. DeGroot 1970) will be 
extended to include positive switching costs. The optimal search and 
switching strategy for any captive consumer is described in Lemma 1 (with 
the minor simplification of VpL ≤ , which will be consistent with the final 
equilibrium.) 
 
Lemma 1:  For any given local price, VpL ≤ , pricing distribution F(p), switching 
cost, s, and sequential search cost, c, an optimal search to switch strategy can be 
described by the following algorithm.  
 
Start:  If LpB =   go to Step 1.  
If LpB ≠    go to Step 2. 
 
Step 1:  If *LL rp >   search an unsearched firm and return to Start. If  
all firms have been previously searched go to 
Step 3. 
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If *LL rp ≤   buy from the local firm without search. 
 
Step 2: If *}min{ rK NL >  search an unsearched firm and return to Start. If  
all firms have been previously searched go to 
Step 3. 
If *}min{ rK NL ≤  stop searching and switch to the firm j offering 
}min{ NLK  
 
Step 3:  Trade with the firm offering  
 }}min{,min{ sPpB NLLn +=  
 
Where the local reservation price, *Lr , is the value of Lr that satisfies (1) and where the 
standard reservation price, *r , is the value of r that satisfies (2). 
 
 cdppfsprsLrp L = −−− )()(      (1) 
 cdppfprrp = − )()(       (2) 
 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
The optimal search to switch strategy comprises of three components. Step 1 
provides a local reservation price rule to decide whether or not the consumer 
should begin to participate in search, or equivalently, whether the consumer 
should continue to further search, having received no offer better than that of 
the local firm. The expected payoff from an initial search can be expressed as 
in (3), where the discovery of a non-local surplus offer of )( spV −−  may be 
discarded or preferred to the local option, depending on whether p is larger 
or smaller than spL − . 
 
cpdFpVpdFspV p
sLp L
sLp
p − −+ −− −
− )()()()(     (3) 
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The local reservation price, *Lr , can then be found by finding the level of the 
local price, Lp , at which the consumer is indifferent between searching, to 
gain an expected payoff of (3), and not searching to gain )( *LrV − . Intuitively, 
this results in an expression for the local reservation price in (1) that sets the 
expected net gains from search,  −−
−sLr
p L dppfspr )()( , equal to the marginal 
cost of search, c, and suggests that search is optimal for any *LL rp > . 
 
Alternatively, one can understand the derivation of *Lr  through inspection of 
(1) and (2). The standard reservation price in (2) is the price at which a 
consumer is indifferent between searching and not, in the classical search 
problem without switching costs. Using the equality of (1) and (2), it must be 
true that srrL +=
** , and so intuitively, the introduction of switching costs 
increases the price at which the consumer is indifferent between searching by 
an amount equal to the switching cost.  
 
On finding a potentially attractive non-local price, spp L −< , the consumer 
moves to Step 2, (via START), to decide whether to accept this price or to 
search yet further by using a second reservation price rule. This reservation 
price differs from the local reservation price, because importantly, the 
decision is now independent of the switching cost, as the consumer is 
comparing only across non-local firms.  
 
Step 3 follows trivially for the scenario in which the consumer has chosen to 
exhaustively search all the alternatives, becoming fully informed. In this case, 
switching costs can still act to reduce the incentive to switch to a non-local 
supplier. 
 
Lemma 1 suggests that switching costs actively affect the way in which 
consumers search in two ways. In Step 1, switching costs can act to make the 
consumer less willing to engage in any price search at all, and in Step 3, 
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switching costs can make the consumer less willing to switch suppliers 
having searched the entire market. Although the effects in Step 3 may offer a 
partial explanation for the large numbers of consumers who search without 
switching as seen in Table 1, such a phenomenon may not be fully explained 
by purely introducing switching costs into a static model of search. Further 
explanations are likely to rest outside the model and may include consumers 
choosing to search for additional reasons, to learn for example, about the 
distribution of prices itself or firms’ heterogeneous product offerings. 
 
Importantly, Lemma 1 implies that search and switching costs are likely to 
have asymmetric effects on a consumer’s participation in search (as seen in 
Step 1). This distinction between the effects of the two costs is contrary to 
most previous findings that suggest that the effects are equivalent and 
symmetrical8. For example, Schlesinger and von der Schulenburg (1991) and 
many of the empirical investigations into search and switching costs propose, 
(under our notation) that a consumer should search if cspEp NLL +>− )( . The 
symmetrical effects result from the assumption that switching costs are 
automatically incurred in the same way as search costs. By incorporating the 
possibility that after an initial search, the consumer may choose not to switch, 
or indeed to search further, Lemma 1 removes this symmetry. Further, note 
that this effect is not dependent upon the assumed method of sequential 
search. Lemma B1 shows that the optimal search to switch strategy under 
simultaneous search can be treated as a special case of Lemma 1. 
 
Firms’ Optimal Pricing Strategies 
Given both the shoppers’ and captives’ optimal search to switch strategies, 
the firms’ optimal response is now found. In parallel to both the search and 
switching cost literatures, firms face some familiar mixed incentives. They can 
either set a low price to compete for one set of consumers (the shoppers) or 
they can set a higher price to exploit another set of consumers (their local 
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captives). As in Stahl (1989), the firms’ pricing decision can be found through 
a series of steps. 
 
Firstly, while a firm’s captive consumers may, in principle, find it optimal to 
search elsewhere it will never be optimal for a firm to let its captive 
consumers do so. Given the pricing decisions of the other firms, a firm will 
always find it profitable to ensure the trade of its local captives by pricing 
below the captive’s local reservation price, ),),((** scpFrr LL =  and reservation 
value, V, as expressed by (4). Captives will now never search in equilibrium, 
and so steps 2 and 3 from Lemma 1 will be made redundant. 
 
},min{ * Vrp L=         (4) 
 
Secondly, while each firm chooses a price low enough to guarantee the trade 
of its captives, firms still face the incentive to lower prices further in order to 
compete for the shoppers. Indeed, in any price tie, a firm can always do better 
by reducing its price by epsilon to attract the proportion of shoppers until 
some price p , where the firm would prefer to price only to its captives. This 
fact implies that no pure strategy pricing equilibrium can exist, nor can there 
be any mass in a mixed strategy equilibrium pricing distribution, F(p).  
 
Finally, one can find the equilibrium pricing distribution by noting that the 
expected profits of firm i with price p, given all other firms are pricing with 
F(p) can be expressed as in (5) 
 
=))(,( pFpipi  ]))(1()/)1[(( 1−−+− npFnp µµ  ∀ pp ≤   (5) 
 
where firm i can guarantee the custom of its )/)1(( nµ−  local captives and 
gain the custom of the µ  shoppers if it prices below all the other firms, which 
it does with probability 1))(1( −− npF .  
                                                                                                                                                                      
8 With the exception that Knittel (1997) who offers an equivalent version of Step 1 but fails to 
provide the remaining parts of Lemma 1.  
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Equilibrium profits must be equal to those received by pricing at the upper 
price bound where the firm has an exactly zero chance of attracting the 
shoppers; )/)1(( np µpi −= . Setting (5) equal to this value provides a unique 
expression for the equilibrium pricing distribution as shown in (6), while 
setting this to zero and solving provides the lower price bound, given in (7). 
 
=)( pF
)1/(1))(1(1
−








−−
−
n
np
pp
µ
µ
     (6) 
 
=p  






−+
−
)1(
)1(
µµ
µ
n
p
      (7) 
 
F(p) can then be shown to be well behaved in that pipi =  ∀ ],[ ppp ∈ , with 
pipi < if not, and with 0)(' ≥pF ∀ ],[ ppp ∈ . 
 
4. Results  
This section now carries out some comparative static results. Of particular 
interest will be the equilibrium effects on firm and consumer welfare 
following a) a change in the level of search costs, b) a change in the level of 
switching costs, and in understanding how these effects compare to c) a 
change in the number of competing firms. In what follows, firms’ equilibrium 
profits shall be denoted as pi  and SCW  and CCW  will refer to the expected ex 
ante consumer surplus (welfare) for a shopper and captive, respectively. As a 
benchmark, Result 1 firstly, shows the limit effects of an increase in the 
number of firms.   
 
Result 1:  As the number of competitors, ∞→n , firm profits, 0→pi , shopper 
welfare VCWS → , and captive welfare, 0→CCW . 
 
Proof: See Appendix 
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This result is not new in models of search – it follows directly from 
Proposition 4 of Stahl (1989) and is similar to that in Varian (1980) and 
Morgan et al (2006) – but shows that these rather perverse effects remain with 
the introduction of switching costs. Despite providing more orthodox effects 
on firms’ profits and shoppers’ welfare, (large) increases in the number of 
competing firms can damage captive consumers’ welfare. This effect can be 
explained by what Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) refer to as the 
business stealing and surplus appropriation effects. The business stealing 
effect results from industry profits being divided between more and more 
firms. It prompts firms to compete harder by reducing the lower price bound, 
p , resulting in the expected minimum market price – the price paid by 
shoppers, to tend to zero. The surplus appropriation effect however prompts 
firms to move more probability mass towards the higher end of the price 
distribution, as the chance of attracting the shoppers, 1))(1( −− npF  , decreases 
as the number of firms increases. Captives’ search opportunities worsen as a 
result, allowing firms to shift yet more probability mass upwards so that the 
expected market price – the price paid by captives, tends to the consumer 
reservation value.  
 
The effects of increasing the number of competitors when search is 
simultaneous, rather than sequential, are more complex, and may not be 
consistent with Result 1. Consequently, it is the only result in the paper that is 
not replicated in Appendix B9. 
 
Result 2 now considers the effects of changes in the level of search and 
switching costs. 
 
                                                          
9The effects may differ due to the fact the captives’ reservation price is related to the expected 
minimum price from the set of searched firms, not the average price of a searched firm, as 
was the case in sequential search. As discussed above, the expected minimum and the 
average price can move in opposing directions. See Janssen and Moraga-González (2004).  
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Result 2:  The increase in profits and the decrease in consumer surplus that 
result from an increase in  search costs, c , are at least as large as the effects that result 
from an equivalent increase in switching costs, s , for any 0, >sc . That is,  
0>>
ds
d
dc
d pipi
      ∀ VrL <* , with equalities if not. 
0<<
ds
dCW
dc
dCW tt      ∀ },{ CSt = , and∀ VrL <* , with equalities if not. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
When the levels of search and switching costs are so large that the local 
reservation price becomes constrained by the consumers’ maximum 
willingness to pay, VrL ≥
* , any further increases in the levels of the two costs 
have no effect on equilibrium prices, profits or welfare. However, in the more 
interesting case, when VrL <
* , any increase in search or switching costs will 
produce a new equilibrium price distribution that (first order) stochastically 
dominates the former distribution, such that firms’ profits and the expected 
price paid by both types of consumers increases. More specifically, Result 2 
confirms the asymmetry found in Lemma 1 by suggesting that, for any level 
of the two costs, the absolute increases in prices and profits are larger 
following an increase in search costs, relative to an equivalent increase in 
switching costs.  
 
The intuition behind this result is quite simple. A unit increase in search costs 
relative to a unit increase in switching costs allows firms to price relatively 
‘higher’ as the unit increase in search costs is more powerful in deterring the 
captives from searching. To understand why this might be so, one might 
think that the effect is most likely driven by the fact that consumers may have 
to repeatedly incur search costs. However, as captives do not search in 
equilibrium and as this result still exists under the assumption of 
Page 17 
simultaneous search where the consumer pays a single search cost (see Result 
B2 in the appendix), this effect can, instead, attribute this effect to the fact that 
search costs must be paid regardless of whether the consumer finds a 
worthwhile switching option or not. The conditional payment of switching 
costs makes them less influential in consumers’ search decisions and in firms’ 
ability to price above marginal cost.  
 
5. Implications and Limitations 
While bearing in mind the several caveats that are subsequently discussed, 
this section now examines the implications of the model’s results. For a 
competition authority concerned with choosing a policy with the best chance 
of improving the welfare of consumers, the results would suggest that while 
reducing switching costs or increasing the number of competitors may both 
have (aggregate) benefits, reducing search costs might be the most reliable 
and powerful policy option. With all else equal, it would appear that rather 
than reducing transaction costs or regulating contract termination fees and 
excessive contract cancellation periods, policy may be better targeted at 
improving consumers’ access to easily understood, verifiable, price and 
product information.  
 
Conversely, the corollary of this argument implies that firms’ profits may 
benefit more from a (binding) agreement or practice that aims to increase the 
industry level of search costs, rather than an equivalent practice that increases 
the industry level of switching costs. That is, the increase in profits following 
any practice that makes the identification and comprehension of non-local 
firms’ price offers more costly may be higher than the increase in profits 
following any practice that makes it relatively more costly to trade with non-
local firms. Indeed, one could allege that such practices exist in the mobile 
phone market, where firms commonly offer a host of bewildering multi-part, 
multi-contingent tariffs, perhaps with a view to obfuscate price comparisons. 
However, it is harder to imagine how such practices that aim to raise either 
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industry level search or switching costs could be individually profitable. 
While endogenising the individual firm’s choice of search and switching costs 
is beyond the current paper, one can easily imagine the ideal scenario for a 
firm where it aims to make its own price offers easy to identify, understand 
and switch to, while keeping its rivals’ offers hard to identify, understand and 
switch to its local consumers10. Result 2 suggests such strategies may be 
potentially very powerful for firms and underlines the importance for 
research into obfuscation, as previously argued by Ellison and Ellison (2004)11. 
 
These results and implications should, however, be treated with caution due 
to the following limitations. Firstly, it is important to note that the conditional 
payment feature that generates the differing welfare effects may not be 
unique to switching costs. Some forms of search cost may also be paid 
probabilistically. For example, in searching between stores a consumer may 
not only have to pay (unconditionally) for fuel, but may also have to pay the 
cost of a new tyre, conditional on the probability of having a puncture12. With 
a similar logic to that used in Result 2, one could suggest that the associated 
anti-competitive effects from a unit increase in conditional search costs may 
be weaker than those from a unit increase in unconditional search costs.  
 
Secondly, to provide a tractable and equivalent comparison of the welfare 
effects of the two costs, it has been supposed that the proportion of consumers 
facing the two costs has been equal. Under this assumption, with all else 
equal, it has then been suggested that policy should focus on reducing search 
costs. However, in practice, this conclusion could be less clear cut as unit 
increases in switching costs could provide larger anti-competitive effects if 
there existed a sufficient number of additional consumers that faced only 
                                                          
10
 These arguments mirror some findings in the switching cost literature that allow firms to 
offer price discriminatory discounts in order to compete for non-local consumers while 
retaining high prices for local consumers (Chen 1997, Shaffer and Zhang 2000).  
11 For examples of this research see Ireland (forthcoming), Spiegler (2005) and Wilson (2005). 
12
 I thank Greg Shaffer for this comment and example.  
Page 19 
switching costs. Policy should therefore consider the full consumer 
distribution of search and switching costs before deciding which cost 
reduction would be most beneficial.   
 
Finally, the model is limited, most obviously, by the omission of any dynamic 
competition. Indeed, as mentioned in section 2, the effects of introducing 
competition for pre-purchase consumers can be strong enough to offset any 
anti-competitive effects resulting from lock-in, making the total welfare effects 
of switching costs ambiguous. Nevertheless, using the hitherto unused third 
distinction between search and switching costs; the fact that search costs are 
likely to be faced both before and after any initial purchase, we argue that the 
incorporation of any dynamic effects can only strengthen Result 2. While 
introducing dynamic competition will weaken the effects of switching costs, 
the effects, and the relative potency of search costs will remain. However, the 
static nature of our model does inhibit its ability to understand the longer-
term effects of search and switching costs on competition. Search and 
switching costs have been shown to have potentially ambiguous effects on the 
ability of firms to tacitly collude as it becomes both harder for a firm to 
deviate and for firms to punish a deviation (see Padilla 1995 and Møllgaard 
and Overgaard 2005). Switching costs, in particular may also have an impact 
on the profitability of entry (e.g. Klemperer 1987). Thus, in individual markets 
where issues of tacit price collusion and/or entry are of particular importance, 
the general validity of Result 2 could be questioned. 
 
6. Conclusion 
By introducing switching costs into a standard search-theoretic model of 
competition by Stahl (1989), we have shown search costs may have a 
consistently larger, anti-competitive effect than switching costs. We suggest 
that this result derives not from the fact that search costs may be incurred 
repeatedly before searching, but rather that search costs must be paid 
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regardless of whether the consumer chooses to switch or not. The conditional 
nature of the payment of switching costs makes them less influential in firms’ 
ability to price above marginal cost. 
 
The paper indicates that, with all else equal, firms may face a powerful, 
collective incentive to increase the industry-level of search costs that can be 
stronger than the incentive to raise the industry-level of switching costs. This 
prompts future research in two directions. Firstly, while this collective 
incentive for obfuscation exists, it is not clear how such strategies might be 
profitable at the individual level. Secondly, it is possible to widen the paper’s 
main result by interpreting switching costs as a crude specification of 
symmetric product differentiation. In this case, obfuscation strategies would 
appear to be more profitable for firms than differentiating their product. 
Generalising this and generating more results of the relative welfare effects 
across a wider ranger of strategy options would be very useful in further 
understanding firm behaviour and guiding competition policy.   
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Appendix A: 
 
Lemma 1 Proof:  The proof is a simple extension of a standard search 
problem where each of the (n-1) search options offers a surplus of 
)( spV −− where p is distributed by )( pF . Following the standard results of 
reservation price rules (e.g. DeGroot 1970) and in particular the results by 
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Weitzman (1979) for search over a limited number of options, the following 
algorithm can be shown to be optimal. To show Step 1, where LpB = , note 
that the consumer will be indifferent between accepting Lp and searching 
when *LL rp = . 
*
Lr will then be the value of Lr  that satisfies (A1), noting that 
any discovered price p will only be preferred to the local price iff spp L −< . 
Simplifying yields (1).  
 
cpdFspVpdFrVrV sLrp
p
sLr LL
− −−+ −=−
−
−
)()()()(     (A1) 
 
Step 2 allows for the possibility that LpB ≠ , where the best known deal, 
unlike the local offer, may have an associated switching cost. A new 
reservation price rule follows whereby the consumer will be indifferent 
between i) stopping search and switching to firm offering }min{ NLK and ii) 
continuing search, when *}min{ rK NL = . *r  will be the value of r that 
satisfies (A2), noting now that any discovered price p will only be preferred to 
}min{ NLK iff spsK NL +>+}min{ . Similar simplifications can yield (2).  
 
cpdFspVpdFsrVsrV rp
p
r
− −−+ −−=−− )()()()(    (A2) 
 
Step 3 follows trivially once that the consumer is fully informed.• 
 
For the proofs of Result 1 and 2, it will be useful to rewrite (1) and (2) by using 
integration by parts as  
 
cdppFsLrp =
− )(      (1’) 
cdppFrp = )(      (2’) 
 
Result 1 Proof:  Following Stahl (1989), one can redefine 
)1/(1)/(1)( −−= nnwpF  where ∀ pp < , 0>w  so that 0)( →pF  as ∞→n , with 
all the mass converging on pp = . Given this, it is easy to see from (1’),  
cdppFsLrp =
− )( , that as ∞→n , *Lr  will increase beyond V so that Vp → , and 
=p 0))1(/()1( →−+− µµµ np . Consequently, as ∞→n , 0)/)1(( →−= np µpi . 
To see that 0)( →−= pEVCWC , note that 
VdppFpppdFpE pp
p
p → −== )()()( , and to see that 
VPEVCW nS →−= })(min{ , note that 
0))(1()))(1(1(})(min{ →→ −+= −−= ppFpdppFpPE pp npp nn .• 
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Result 2 Proof:  Consider the case when VrL <
* . Note that p , p and pi  are 
all increasing in *Lr , while 0/)( * ≤LdrpdF ∀ p. Therefore any increase in *Lr  will 
increase profits and produce a first-order stochastically dominant new pricing 
distribution, such that )( pEVCWC −= and })(min{ nS PEVCW −= will both 
fall. We now only need show that 0// ** >> dsdrdcdr LL . This can be shown by 
differentiating (1’), cdprpFsLr
Lrp L
=
−
)( );( , with the use of the implicit function 
theorem and Leibniz’s equation to give  
 
  
 
Firstly, note that 1/* >dsdrL as the denominator must be smaller than the 
numerator. One can show this by rewriting the denominator as 
dpdrpdFpfsLrp L +− )/)(()(  and then showing that it must lie in the region 
))(,0( srF L −  because  
0/)( <LdrpdF  and 0
))(1(
)1(
1)/)(()(
)1/(1
>




 −−
−
=+
−n
L
L
np
pr
npn
drpdFpf
µ
µ
µ
     Lrp <∀  
Secondly, it then follows that dsdrdcdr LL //
** > ∀ cs, as 1)( <− srF L . Finally, in 
the case that  VrL ≥
* , Vp = and so any increase in s or c will leave p , p , F(p) 
and pi  unchanged. • 
 
 
Appendix B:  Simultaneous Search 
 
Lemma B1:   For any given local price, Vp ≤0 , pricing distribution F(p), 
switching cost, s, and simultaneous search method that searches an exogenous 
number of )1( −≤ nx  non-local firms for a total search cost of c, an optimal search to 
switch strategy can be described by the following decision rule. 
 
Search if *Rp Li > , and if not, buy from the local firm without search. Having 
searched, trade with the firm offering }}min{,min{ sKpB NLiLin += . 
 
Where *R  is the value of R that satisfies (B1) and where ))(1(1)( xpFpG −−=  and 
g(p)=G’(p). 
 
cdppGpgspR sRp
sR
p == −−
−− )()()(    (B1) 
 










+−
−
=
− dpdrpdFsrF
srF
ds
dr
sLr
p LL
LL
)/)(()(
)(*










+−
=
− dpdrpdFsrFdc
dr
sLr
p LL
L
)/)(()(
1*
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Proof:  Lemma B1 forms a special case of Lemma 1. Steps 2 and 3 are 
not applicable, and we simply need to provide an amendment to step 1. In 
particular, on searching, the consumer will only switch if the 
L
i
NL
i psK <+}min{  where the })(min{ NLiKE for a given number of searched 
firms, x, will be distributed with xpFpG ))(1(1)( −−= . Thus, the consumer 
will be indifferent between searching when *Rp Li =   
 
cpdGspVpdGRVRV sRp
p
sR − −−+ −=−
−
−
)()()()(    (B2) 
 
where *R  will be the value of R that satisfies (B2) using similar 
simplifications or integration parts to above.• 
 
Firms’ Best Response: As before, with only the change that }*,min{ VRp = . 
 
Result B2:  For any level of simultaneous search cost, 0>c , and switching cost, 
0>s , 
0>>
ds
d
dc
d pipi
      ∀ cs, and ∀ VR <* , with equalities if not. 
0<<
ds
dCW
dc
dCW tt      ∀ cs, ,∀ },{ CSt = , and∀ VR <* , with equalities if not. 
 
Proof:  From before, it follows we need only show that 
0/*/* >> dsdRdcdR  for VR <* . Using (B1), cdppGsRp =
− )( ,  
 
  
 
This is very similar to before and we need only show that the denominator is 
still positive, to show that 1/*/* >> dsdRdcdR . Rewriting the denominator 
as dpdRpdGpGsRp ))/)(()('( +−  and using the fact that 
1))(1(1))(1(1)( −




 −−
−=−−=
n
x
x
np
pRpFpG
µ
µ
, one can easily show this to be 
true as  01))(1()1()/)(()('
1
>








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
 −−
−
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n
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µ
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